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Abstract: 
Academic analyses of market systems are deeply divided. While economists tend to neglect the 
personal and sociological factors that shape the behaviour of market actors, sociologists tend 
to discount the possibility of a systematic analysis of the consequences of market interactions. 
Economists thus end up with unrealistic models of markets, and sociologists end up unable to 
explain the economic impact of markets. This paper outlines a project that aims to produce an 
analysis of markets that is both sociologically realistic and capable of explaining economic 
effects.  
The project will construct a realistic ontological analysis of market systems, developed using a 
critical realist methodology. Market systems, it will argue, are social structures that depend 
ontologically upon both human individuals and a number of normative institutions. These 
institutions tend to produce coordinated interactions between market actors, and these 
interactions underpin mechanisms that endow market systems with emergent causal powers. 
Different types of interactions underpin different market mechanisms, including mechanisms 
like those theorised by mainstream economists, but also others that they tend to neglect, and 
an adequate understanding of real-world markets depends on analysing these multiple 
mechanisms and how they interact.  
This will be a theoretical project in economic sociology, drawing on existing empirical work 
without conducting new empirical research. It will be focussed primarily on contemporary 
product markets in advanced capitalist economies, while selected historical and alternative 
contemporary models will be considered more briefly to illustrate both the historical specificity 
of the dominant contemporary model and the possibility of alternative types of market system. 
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1 INTRODUCTION1 
Academic analyses of market systems are deeply divided. Amongst economists, there is a 
tendency to neglect the personal and sociological factors that shape the behaviour of market 
actors, and to assume that these can be safely abstracted from in analysing the causal 
consequences of market interactions. Often their assumptions – most strikingly the common 
assumption that market actors are purely rational, calculating, optimising agents – are 
strikingly unrealistic and yet it is believed that they are acceptable, in part because they make 
it possible to produce mathematically tractable models of market interactions. Amongst 
sociologists, there is a tendency to focus on the social factors that shape the behaviour of 
market actors, while discounting the possibility of a systematic analysis of the consequences of 
market interactions. This may produce more realistic accounts of market behaviour, but it 
leaves sociologists poorly equipped to explain the economic effects of markets. Economists 
thus end up with unrealistic models of markets, and sociologists end up unable to explain the 
causal impact of markets.  
This paper outlines a research project that seeks to bridge this gap by producing an analysis of 
markets that recognizes the need for both a realistic sociological explanation of the behaviour 
of market actors and an analysis of how such behaviour produces systematic economic effects. 
Such an analysis has the potential to be both more credible than economists’ models and more 
productive than sociological critiques of those models. From a political perspective, it has the 
potential to integrate our understandings of the strengths of markets and their weaknesses. 
Hence, although this is not a project with short-term policy-related deliverables, it offers a 
potential framework for a more balanced and productive politics of the market. 
The paper begins by outlining the intellectual context of the project, then its scope and 
methodology. This is followed by two sections introducing the kind of argument I expect to 
develop during the project. I will argue that market systems are best understood as two-level 
social structures. At the first level normative, organisational and emotional factors shape the 
practices of individual market actors, including specific market strategies. At the second level, 
interactions between buyers and sellers that are driven by these strategies generate market 
mechanisms and thus systematic economic effects. Each of these levels is discussed in a 
separate section, and I conclude with a discussion of the project’s potential significance. 
2 INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
In terms of its objectives and its objects of study, this project bridges the disciplines of 
economics and sociology. In recognising the potential validity, if only partial and limited, of 
economic models of market mechanisms, it will engage more positively with mainstream 
economics than is perhaps common in economic sociology. Furthermore, arguments 
complementary to those to be developed here can be found in the work of some contemporary 
institutional economists (e.g. Hodgson, 1988) and perhaps some other traditions in heterodox 
economics. Nevertheless, in most respects this project has much more in common with 
economic sociology than with most economics: a central and fundamental feature of the 
ontology will be the manifold dependencies of market mechanisms on normative social 
structures; the project will adopt realisticness rather than mathematical tractability as its 
criterion of the adequacy of ontological hypotheses; and there is no intention or expectation 
that it might lead to new mathematical models of market mechanisms. The project will, as 
Smelser and Swedberg put it, follow the tradition of economic sociology in regarding “the 
economic process as an organic part of society” (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 6), while also 
pursuing their vision of “complementary articulation” of theories from both economics and 
sociology (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 20). 
                                           
1 This working paper presents an initial tentative outline of a future research project. I would like to thank Mark 
Harvey for his very valuable comments, and the British Academy for its financial support, as this paper has been 
prepared during my tenure of a British Academy Post Doctoral Fellowship in the Department of Sociology at Essex. I 
also thank the participants at a CRESI seminar in November 2009 for their useful comments. 
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As a number of scholars have observed, economists have paid remarkably little attention to 
the nature of markets as real social phenomena as opposed to their representation as abstract 
mathematical models (e.g. Callon, 1998a: 1; Hodgson, 1988: 172; Nee, 2005: 56). In recent 
years the most prominent attempts in economic sociology to address this absence have come 
from the (post) actor-network theory tradition led (in economic sociology, at least) by Michel 
Callon.2 At one level, this tradition appears to have revitalised the sociological analysis of 
markets. Perhaps its most valuable innovation is the concept of market devices, conglomerates 
or assemblages of practices and objects that help to structure markets by providing resources 
that come to shape the decisions of market actors or calculative agencies – devices such as 
financial charts, focus groups, analysts’ reports, purchasing centres and supermarket displays 
(Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007). But such analyses are entirely and indeed intentionally 
uncritical of the economists’ conceptions of the market as essentially a site of rational 
calculation.3 They provide a sociological account of some of the ways in which market actors 
are enabled to become calculative agencies, to become the homo economicus (Callon, 1998b: 
51) of the economists’ models. One consequence of this analysis, it seems, is to validate and 
defend the economists’ conceptions of markets as purely calculative, as abstractable (without 
adverse consequences) from the details of interpersonal interaction when it comes to 
theorising their economic effects. Callon’s work, as Miller puts it, “amounts to a defence of the 
economists’ model of a framed and abstracted market” (Miller, 2002: 218).  
From the perspective to be developed in this project, Callon’s approach is undermined by a 
failure to recognise that the economic behaviour of individual agents is not merely driven by 
calculative rationality but also by a range of other sociological factors. Because this is so, the 
strategy of separating the sociological analysis of such behaviour from the economic analysis 
of market effects cannot be sustained, since it is only if individual agents are purely calculative 
and interest-driven that the neoclassical analysis of markets can be justified, and insulated 
from further sociological considerations. If, as I will argue, the behaviour of economic agents is 
driven by a complex mix of factors, and if we recognise that market mechanisms depend upon 
the nature of the interactions between individual agents, then market mechanisms themselves 
depend upon considerations that Callon has marginalised.  
These theoretical weaknesses arise, in turn, from the ontological weaknesses of (post) actor-
network theory. In their determination to ‘keep the social flat’ (Elder-Vass, 2008b; Latour, 
2005: 165-72) they deny the causal significance of social structures (see Barry et al., 2002: 
295) with the result that they are unable to theorise either the systematic influence of the 
social institutions that provide the context upon which market systems depend or the market 
system as a structural entity that produces systemic economic effects (an issue that must 
therefore, for them, be passed over to the economists). Above all, they are unable to 
recognise the systematic ways in which the economic behaviour of market systems depends 
upon the characteristic patterns of interaction between market actors. Although they name 
markets “collective calculative devices” (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) the “collective” here is never 
more than a situationally-specific collection of human and non-human actants, and the 
“calculative” always relates to situationally-specific decisions of market actors and not to 
systemic outcomes. 
By contrast, the project proposed here will draw on a tradition of thinking – critical realism – 
that stresses the existence of social structures, and their emergent causal capabilities (e.g. 
Archer, 1995), while also recognising that they depend upon the interacting activities of 
individual human actors (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]; Lawson, 1997: 166-70). Although critical 
realism has had relatively little impact on economic sociology to date, an important exception 
is the work of Andrew Sayer on “moral economy” which he defines as “the study of how 
economic activities of all kinds are influenced and structured by moral dispositions and norms, 
and how in turn those norms may be compromised, overridden, or reinforced by economic 
pressures” (Sayer, 2004: 2). From this perspective, “we can acknowledge the partial 
autonomy of market forces… while arguing that they can never completely escape their 
dependence on non-market and non-economic processes or aspects of social life, so that in 
                                           
2 I call this tradition (post) actor-network theory in deference to its practitioners’ recent ambivalence about its name. 
For a critique of this tradition from a realist perspective, see (Elder-Vass, 2008b).  
3 Callon himself argues that we should abandon the critique of economists (Barry, Slater, & Callon, 2002: 301). 
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making abstractions in order to analyse modern economies, we must remember this 
conditionality” (Sayer, 2004: 3). 
Critical realism thus offers an alternative to the methodological individualism of (post) actor-
network theory, rational choice theory, and games theory. This is a perspective that enables us 
to recognise market systems as social structures with causal powers while examining how 
those powers depend upon the nature of socio-economic interactions. It is the exploration of 
these properties of real, as opposed to idealised, market systems, and how they arise from 
such interactions that is the central focus of this project. 
3 SCOPE 
The central objective of the planned project is to conduct a realistic ontological analysis of 
market structures. This analysis will be focussed on the relationship between the exchange 
behaviour of market actors, on the one hand, and systemic effects of market systems on the 
other. Market systems will be analysed as social structures with emergent powers that depend 
on the interactions between market actors and thus on their behaviour in market exchanges, 
and that behaviour itself will be seen as the causal product, not simply of isolated calculating 
individuals but of socially-embedded individuals whose actions are systematically affected by 
normative social structures as well as their needs, interests, and emotions.  
It follows from this focus that the project will not address a great deal of other economic 
activity and the structures that may result from and shape it, including processes of production 
and consumption, and the vast range of gifts and exchanges that occur outside the market 
even in the most marketised of contemporary economies. 
Furthermore, any account of the operation of market systems must inevitably draw its 
understanding from evidence that relates to specific market systems. An account that seeks to 
explore real, as opposed to idealised, market systems must recognise that not all market 
systems are necessarily alike. Hence we must recognise that we may develop different 
understandings of market systems depending on which ones form the evidence base for our 
analysis. As I will argue below, the causal effects of market systems depend at least in part on 
the institutional context and on the effects that this has on the strategies and indeed the 
nature of market actors, and since such institutional contexts do vary between societies we 
should expect that there will be different kinds of market systems with different economic 
mechanisms and effects. If this is so, there can be no universal theory of market systems, but 
only historically specific theories of specific market systems, from which we may sometimes be 
able to generalise, but only cautiously and provisionally.  
Given the vast range of historical contexts in which markets have operated, and the vast range 
of evidence in the literature, it will be necessary to narrow the focus of the study to restrict it 
to a manageable size. The primary focus will be on contemporary product markets – markets 
for goods and services – in advanced capitalist economies, since these are the paradigm case 
of markets most commonly studied by both contemporary economists and economic 
sociologists. Within this category, several varieties of product market will be considered, 
including primary commodity markets, inter-producer markets, and final consumer markets. 
However, the project will also consider a small number of other cases more briefly, for two 
reasons. First, in order to illustrate the possibility of different mechanisms occurring in 
different types of market systems, and thus to justify the claim that its analysis of 
contemporary product markets is historically specific. And second, to illustrate the possibility 
that markets could be different; that policy makers need not assume the necessity for markets 
to follow the predominant model in contemporary capitalist product markets. The alternative 
cases to be studied will be selected during the project. They may include past market systems 
documented in the historical literature (e.g. Braudel, 1982), specific contemporary labour or 
financial markets, and/or ‘alternative’ contemporary markets that do not conform to the 
dominant commercial model. 
Nor will the project address questions of historical development or change in market systems, 
including the historical roots of those contemporary market systems that will be its main focus. 
Such questions would be of central importance to a more general theory of market systems, 
but the focus of this project is different: it is on the synchronic mode of operation of market 
systems, on the ways in which actually existing market systems exert a causal influence on the 
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social world, rather than on the diachronic question of how those market systems have come 
to be the way they are. 
4 METHODOLOGY4 
This section briefly outlines both a philosophical ontology and a method, consistent with this 
philosophical ontology, for developing more local ontologies. This method is justified in more 
detail elsewhere (for example, Elder-Vass, 2005, 2007b; forthcoming: chapters 2-4); the 
purpose of this section is to provide just enough detail to enable the reader to make sense of 
the proposal developed in the remainder of the paper.  
The philosophical ontology assumed here is a realist ontology based on Roy Bhaskar’s work, as 
developed primarily in A Realist Theory of Science (Bhaskar, 1975) (also see Elder-Vass, 
2005). This is most easily approached through the concept of causal powers. For Bhaskar (at 
least in this work) causal powers are possessed by things, which we may also call entities. 
These powers arise from what he calls generative mechanisms, or sometimes just 
mechanisms: processes in which the parts of the entity interact to produce its powers (see 
Bunge, 2003: 20). These mechanisms therefore depend on the composition and structure of 
the entities concerned. To be more precise, they depend upon (i) the set of parts; (ii) the 
powers of those parts; and (iii) the set of relations between these parts; that are characteristic 
(and definitive) of entities this type. Because they depend not just on the parts of the entity 
possessing them, but also on the relations between those parts that only obtain when they 
make up a whole of this type, these powers are emergent properties of the things possessing 
them. They are emergent in the sense that they are possessed by the whole but would not be 
possessed by the parts in isolation or in some other type of structure because they depend on 
the relations in which the parts must stand to be an entity of this type.5  
Actual events, however, are not produced by single causal powers, but instead are the result 
of interactions between whatever contingent sets of causal powers are implicated in the event. 
They are, to use Bhaskar’s term, multiply determined by a set of interacting causal powers 
(Bhaskar, 1975: 109-11). One consequence is that causal powers do not produce 
exceptionless regularities like those described by Hempel’s deductive-nomological causal laws 
(Hempel, 1968), but rather operate as tendencies, tendencies that may be frustrated when 
causal powers with conflicting tendencies interact with them. 
Given such a philosophical ontology, an important part of the scientific enterprise is the 
development of local ontologies – what Bhaskar calls scientific ontologies and Benton and Craib 
call regional ontologies (Benton & Craib, 2001: 5; Bhaskar, 1986: 36). A regional ontology 
describes the complex of entities and powers at work in the events studied by some particular 
discipline, or in a set of disciplines that studies a particular group of phenomena.  One 
implication of the critical realist philosophical ontology is that we can develop regional 
ontologies by identifying the causal powers at work in producing these phenomena, the entities 
that possess them, the mechanisms that produce them, and hence the structure of parts and 
relations upon which they depend (Elder-Vass, 2007b).6 This becomes a potentially recursive 
exercise because those parts are themselves entities with properties that must be analysed in 
the same way. Ultimately, we would hope to be able to follow this chain back until we can 
recognise the parts as entities that are already adequately theorised in neighbouring 
disciplines. 
The primary criterion that must be satisfied by regional ontologies is coherence, at a number 
of levels. First, the set of entities, powers, mechanisms, parts, and relations hypothesised 
must be mutually consistent. Second, they must be consistent with the broader philosophical 
ontology (or it must itself develop to accommodate any fundamental problems). Third, they 
                                           
4 Much of this section is drawn from (Elder-Vass, 2009). 
5 This is what may be called a weak version of emergence (Stephan, 2002: 79). Although Stephan argues that weak 
emergentism is necessarily reductionist, I have disputed this (Elder-Vass, forthcoming: ch. 2) At times Bhaskar himself 
is ambivalent about the variety of emergence he endorses (Kaidesoja, 2009: 301-6).  
6 Hence I am not employing the method of transcendental argument, employed by Bhaskar in A Realist Theory of 
Science (Bhaskar, 1975), and by the leading critical realist economist, Tony Lawson (Lawson, 1997: 49-51; 2003: 34). 
Although, unlike some of Lawson’s critics (Davidsen, 2009; Vromen, 2009), I consider this method useful, it is not 
appropriate to the kind of detailed ontological work to be pursued here. 
CRESI WORKING PAPER 
CWP-2009-06-Soc-Ontol-Mkt-Systems-Final.doc 
cresi.essex.ac.uk Page 9 of 16 © 2010, Dave Elder-Vass 
must be consistent with a plausible complex of local theory. Indeed ontology and theory 
overlap at the level of theorising mechanisms, a task referred to in the critical realist literature 
as retroduction (and the retroduction of market mechanisms will be a central concern of this 
project). And finally, the plausibility of that theory itself depends upon consistency with 
empirical evidence, and so the ontology must be consistent with such evidence by proxy: by 
being consistent with empirically sound theory. Such consistency is not, however, easily 
tested, since individual events may be causally influenced by many different mechanisms, and 
claims for the effect of any particular mechanism may difficult to disentangle from the effects 
of other interacting mechanisms. 
A social ontology is a regional ontology for the social sciences, an ontological analysis of the 
entities with causal powers that interact to produce social events. As the argument above 
implies, a realist social ontology should be consistent both with the realist philosophical 
ontology of causal powers and also with plausible sociological theory and empirical evidence.  
It is perhaps unfashionable, even amongst realists, to argue that it is entities with causal 
powers that cause social events. I have, however, been developing this argument for a 
number of years, and have argued, for example, that we can understand human agency, 
organisations, and normative social institutions in these terms (Elder-Vass, 2007a, 2007c, 
2008a; forthcoming: chs. 5-8). This section illustrates the approach with a brief discussion of 
normative social institutions, as these are fundamental to the proposal developed in this paper. 
Inevitably, as an introductory version of the argument, this section neglects many complexities 
and issues; the reader is referred for a fuller account to (Elder-Vass, forthcoming: ch. 6). 
While many sociologists have argued that social practices are guided by norms, which are 
inculcated into individuals through a process of socialisation, the ontological status of norms 
and of normative social institutions has always been contentious. Is normativity simply 
produced by individuals, as methodological individualists argue, or is it a product of some kind 
of social structure, and if so what form could such a structure take, that is in some sense 
distinct from individuals and yet able to influence them? Applying the philosophical ontology 
outlined above, I have argued that there are entities with the causal powers to encourage 
individuals to conform with social norms, and that these entities are what I have called norm 
circles.  
A norm circle is the group of people who are committed to endorsing and enforcing a particular 
norm. Each member of such a norm circle believes not only that the norm concerned is an 
appropriate guide to behaviour, but also that it is appropriate for them to act in support of that 
norm, and that when they do so they are likely to be supported by others as they are acting in 
a way that is itself socially endorsed. Norms may be endorsed and enforced in a wide variety 
of ways, from outright physical punishment for non-compliance through to the most subtle 
indications of approval or disapproval of a particular style of behaviour. The result of such 
actions in support of a norm is to produce in those who experience them the belief that they 
face an environment in which conformance with the norm will be positively approved and/or 
non-conformance will be negatively sanctioned. As a result, they will develop a belief that it is 
in their interests to conform with the norm (and they may also internalise a moral commitment 
to it) and an increased tendency to conform with it. This does not, however, entail consensus 
about norms: individuals may conform to them for purely instrumental reasons, and such 
conformity may be in part a product of unequal power relations between the members of the 
norm circles concerned. 
What is ontologically distinctive about this argument is the claim that it is the norm circle that 
has this effect, rather than society in general, and rather than the individuals who endorse and 
enforce the norm. My argument is that those individuals support the norm as they do because 
they are members of such a group. Because they understand that their endorsing and 
enforcing action is likely to be supported by other members of the norm circle they are willing 
to act in support of the norm themselves. In other words, this group of people constitutes an 
entity whose parts are the individual members, related to each other through a mutual 
commitment to act in support of the norm concerned (though they are generally not aware of 
the precise extent of the network of such commitments that binds the whole norm circle 
together). Because they are related to each other in this way, they act differently than they 
would if they were not members of such a group: they endorse and enforce the norm. Even if, 
without the group, they still personally believed in the appropriateness of the norm, they 
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would be less likely to act in support of it if they did not feel that others were also committed 
to it. Hence this additional willingness to endorse and enforce it is a causal power of the group, 
a product of the set of parts and relations between them that exists only when the group 
exists. It is the mechanism, arising from the set of parts and relations between them that 
constitute the group, that produces the norm circle’s power to influence individuals. And when 
individuals who are part of such a group act in support of the relevant norm, they do so on 
behalf of the group; the causal power of the group is expressed through those individuals who 
act on its behalf. 
In practice, the concept of an institution is used quite diversely, and often reflects more 
complex social structures than single norms. Consider, for example, the highly pertinent cases 
of property and money. Neither property nor money is defined by a single social norm or rule, 
but rather a complex of interdependent rules, regarding the kinds of rights that individuals 
may claim over items of various types. Furthermore, the formulation and enforcement of such 
rules depends not only on the more informal sorts of interactions used to illustrate the concept 
of a norm circle above, but also depends critically upon formal organisations, above all the 
state and its use of the law to endorse and enforce normative standards. I propose to use the 
term institutional complexes to refer to such structures: those defined by multiple 
interdependent norms and/or laws.7  
The project proposed here will apply the ontological method outlined above to develop an 
ontology of market systems. Such an ontology should be consistent with our actual experience 
of economic transactions, as opposed to a theoretically convenient idealisation of them. This is 
not to say that no abstraction will be involved, but such abstraction will be shaped by the 
ontological agenda of identifying social entities with causal powers and how these interact to 
produce socio-economic events, as opposed to the theoretical agenda of portraying markets as 
smoothly functioning systems that can be conveniently represented as mathematical models.  
Furthermore, any ontology of market systems must be compatible/coherent with a plausible 
ontology of the rest of the social world, as opposed to the assumption that the rest of the 
social world can simply be ignored in theorising economic mechanisms. In addition to simple 
social institutions, it will need to be compatible with a coherent ontological understanding of 
individual agents, of firms, of property rights and of money (and possibly other related social 
phenomena). My previous work has already developed such understandings of individual 
agents and of organisations in general, but this project will need to consider firms more 
specifically, and the institutional complexes of property and money, as part of the process of 
analysing the ontology of market systems. 
As should become clear from the remainder of this document, the development of a social 
ontology also depends on the production or assembly of a compatible body of theory, and 
through this requirement, on relevant empirical work. While this project will not include 
primary empirical research, I will seek to establish coherence with such a body of work 
through engagement with the existing literature on the operation of markets and related social 
phenomena. It is important to recognise that this is inevitably an iterative process: not only is 
our understanding of theory guided by our ontology, but our ontology must be responsive to 
empirically well-founded theory (see Elder-Vass, 2007b). 
5 NORMATIVITY AND EXCHANGE 
The next two sections outline some of the more specific arguments concerning exchange and 
the mechanisms it produces that will be considered and developed in this project. Market 
systems will be analysed in this project as two-level social structures; at the first level, 
institutional and other factors shape the market strategies of market actors, and at the 
second, interactions between buyers and sellers driven by such strategies generate systematic 
economic effects. This section considers some of the factors affecting the first of these two 
levels.   
Exchange is a fundamentally institutional process. Most centrally, at least as regards the 
exchange of material commodities, what is exchanged is not merely material objects but 
                                           
7 An institutional complex, therefore, corresponds roughly to the definition of institution given, for example, in (Nee, 
2005: 55) and (Nee & Swedberg, 2005: xxxviii). 
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property rights in such objects, and such property rights always depend on institutional 
complexes, as defined above. When we purchase a commodity, we acquire a socially 
recognised and normatively enforced right to the exclusive use of the item concerned, or at 
least to some of the uses of the item concerned (when we purchase a book, for example, we 
do not acquire the right to reproduce the text as if it were our own work). Such rights depend 
on the existence of more or less ubiquitous norm circles prepared to support them; they are, 
in other words, dependent on social structures. Every market transaction is suffused with the 
institutional, since it is always an exchange of institutionalised rights. 
Furthermore, the entire process of exchange is normatively framed and constrained (in ways 
that may vary from one social context to another). We are guided, for example, by social 
norms that regulate what kinds of things may be exchanged, who we may or should not 
purchase from or sell to, the actual conduct of the sales process, and obligations to provide 
accurate information regarding the goods concerned. Buyers are motivated, in part at least, by 
desires that are themselves normatively influenced – we may feel obliged to wear smart 
clothes, for example, and thus to replace them frequently. Callon’s market devices, which help 
market actors to evaluate the alternatives open to them, are also at least in part institutional 
products: analysts’ reports, for example, are of value only because of certain standards of 
accuracy that are required in financial reporting and certain standards that enable the reader 
to interpret them, and supermarket displays can influence us only when and because we 
understand the conventions guiding them.8 Even practices on how to price commodities are 
institutionalised (Harvey, forthcoming). It is not enough to say that economic activities are 
embedded in a social context; as Sayer puts it “this overlooks the norms which are internal to 
economic practices themselves” (Sayer, 2004: 5). 
For thinkers like Callon, such institutions merely make us into the calculative rational actors of 
traditional economic theory, but in practice they also produce habits of action, commitments to 
practices that can only be described as rational by stretching this concept to the point of 
triviality, and commitments to social relationships that are at least as much emotional as 
calculative. As Bourdieu argues, such institutionalised dispositions become embodied in our 
habitus, providing “a highly economical principle of action” in “the ordinary conditions of 
existence, which, either because of time pressure or an insufficiency of requisite knowledge, 
allow little scope for the conscious, calculated evaluation of the chances of profit” (Bourdieu, 
2005: 85).9 And our actions are also influenced by our emotional needs and moral 
commitments, including for example a desire to avoid harming others (Sayer, 2004: 4), the 
desire to provide for our loved ones, and our need to maintain a set of enriching social 
relationships. Such needs and commitments may take forms that are influenced by our 
normative environment, but they are also a distinct and non-trivial factor amongst the set of 
causes that influence our behaviour. 
To the extent that our behaviour is systematically influenced by normative standards and more 
emotional factors, we may adopt regularised social practices. Such practices may have two 
structural faces. On the one hand is the aspect that has been stressed above: that to the 
extent that they are normatively shaped, they are the product of social structures, of norm 
circles. But the other is that where such practices lead to regularised patterns of interaction 
those interactions themselves may generate further causal mechanisms. I have discussed this 
phenomenon in my analysis of the ontology of organisations (Elder-Vass, forthcoming: ch. 7). 
Organisations, like market systems, depend profoundly on normative institutions: it is the 
normative expectations associated with different roles that shape the interactions between 
members of organisations. But at a second level, those normatively coordinated interactions 
become the mechanisms that generate the organisation’s causal powers. For example, an 
organisation adopting something like Adam Smith’s principle of the division of labour will 
establish a set of relations between its members that give the organisation the causal power to 
be more productive than its members would be outside such an organisation (Archer, 1995: 
51; 1996: 686; Smith, 1970 [1776]: 109-110). Here we have two levels of mechanism at 
work. The way the members of the organisation interact is a product of their normative beliefs, 
                                           
8 It is striking that Callon ignores the dependence of the institutional element of market devices on normative social 
structures (see Miller, 2002: 223). 
9 I have discussed Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in more detail in (Elder-Vass, 2007c). 
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and thus of the norm circles that produced them, but the coordinated interactions within the 
organisation itself produce a further and non-normative causal mechanism that gives the 
organisation its causal powers.  
The project proposed here will seek to apply a similar model to the ontology of market 
systems. It will investigate not only how the behaviour of market actors is influenced by 
normative institutions but also how this results in coordinated interactions that generate 
further systemic structural effects: the causal powers of market systems. 
6 MARKET MECHANISMS 
In this paper I have avoided the term markets, and instead talked of market systems. This 
reflects an initial provisional ontological hypothesis: that the concept of a market, as it is used 
in economic theory, refers to an imaginary idealisation that is not to be found in real product 
exchange. Clearly product exchanges do occur, and we may reasonably refer to these as 
market transactions, and to those who transact as market actors. But the concept of a market 
implies that there is a bounded set of such transactions (bounded, that is, by excluding other 
transactions) that inter-relate in ways that can produce the effects theorised by mainstream 
economics; it implies market closure. Perhaps in some financial markets such closure is 
obtainable by organisational fiat, but in product markets this is much less plausible. As an 
initial ontological hypothesis, then, I propose that the social structure to be examined in this 
project should be understood as a market system, that such systems are composed of people 
and organisations that buy or sell commodities of any type or consider doing so, and that the 
boundaries between market systems, if there are such boundaries, must be established by 
investigation and analysis rather than assumed at the outset. It is through studying the 
interactions between market actors that we will understand the real market mechanisms at 
work in our social economies, and once our objective becomes the analysis of real market 
systems rather than idealised models we cannot assume neat market boundaries.  
In order to study these interactions it will be necessary to focus on particular types of 
regularised practice. My intention is to focus on the various strategies of market actors that 
are licensed or encouraged by different normative, emotional and organisational pressures. 
These strategies may include those assumed and modelled by neoclassical economists, such 
as, for consumers ‘buy as cheap as possible’ and ‘buy what meets your needs best in the 
current circumstances’, and for commercial businesses ‘adjust prices and production to 
improve profits and/or growth’. For traditional neoclassical economics, such strategies provide 
the bridge between the presumed motivations of homo economicus (the disposition to pursue 
self-interest by rational choice) and the price-equilibration mechanism that they see as 
characteristic of markets. 
But as has been argued above, there are other motivations at work in exchange behaviour, 
and these may generate other strategies that are equally fundamental to buying and selling 
behaviour. Such strategies cannot always simply be subsumed into the neoclassical model as 
‘preferences’: some may not just affect demand curves but alter the whole mode of operation 
of the market system. To be more specific, such strategies may combine in ways that generate 
market mechanisms other than neoclassical equilibration. Here I do not intend to justify this 
argument in detail; this will be one of the tasks of the project. But I do want to indicate some 
of the strategies that seem to indicate that such an analysis would be fruitful. 
For the purpose of illustrating the structure of the argument, consider some of the other 
strategies that may be adopted by capitalist enterprises when they act as sellers: (a) product 
innovation; (b) market innovation; (c) drive out competitors; but perhaps most significantly 
for market structure (d) seek to develop preferential attachments by buyers, where 
preferential attachments are non-price reasons why buyers prefer to purchase from one seller 
rather than another.10 This last strategy rests on differentiation of the seller’s product or of 
some aspect of their offer, and thus fits well with Chamberlin’s well-known account of 
monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1956). For example, preferential attachments may be 
established by developing ‘personal’ relationships with customers that encourage a sense of 
                                           
10 On this strategy, which appears to be widespread, “The way to profitability is not through disentanglement, but 
through further entanglement” (Miller, 2002: 227). 
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loyalty, or providing a particularly user-friendly interface on the seller’s web site. Similarly, 
sellers might exercise various forms of power to secure preferential attachment, such as 
pressing governments to place non-price obstacles in the way of other sellers, or bribing 
purchasing staff in buying organisations. However, Chamberlin seeks to model this process 
using conventional mathematical models of supply and demand. By contrast, I suggest, this 
strategy exploits key sociological (and indeed economic) elements of buyers’ motivations that 
cannot be represented adequately in conventional demand curves.   
On the buyer side, consider for the purposes of this illustration some of the possible strategies 
of individual consumers. These may include, for example, (A) buy conveniently (which 
economists may analyse as ‘minimise transaction costs’ but which is also motivated by the 
avoidance of psychological disruptions, so that buyers may follow this strategy in ways that 
don’t minimise transaction costs; and it may be rational to do so, for example because the 
purchase of necessary commodities is not what we live for and may represent a distraction 
from activities that are more important to the buyer)11; (B) reduce risk (e.g. by buying from 
trusted suppliers or buying familiar commodities, even when potentially ‘better’ alternatives 
are available; economists may analyse this in terms of information costs but again the 
considerations are often psychological rather than quantitatively rational); (C) pursue status 
(not just in terms of what is bought, but also in terms of where and how it is bought – e.g. 
using high status shops rather than low status ones even though goods are more expensive); 
(D) pursue life goals (e.g. ‘green’ purchasing decisions, which may include avoidance of 
unnecessary purchasing – as in Soper’s notion of an alternative hedonism (Soper, 1998; 
Soper, Ryle, & Thomas, 2009)); (E) seek enriching social interaction through the buying 
process (perhaps increasingly common if contemporary life is characterised by increasing 
social isolation); (F) shopping as an enyoyable leisure activity. 
This is not intended as a comprehensive list of significant market actor strategies, but it gives 
some initial indication of how this approach might contribute to understanding market 
mechanisms. Each of these strategies may be traced back to more basic motivations that are 
shaped by norms and emotions (at least for individual actors). Having identified such motives 
and strategies the project will work through the kinds of interactions that result and their 
causal consequences: in other words, to identify the systemic mechanisms that they generate, 
how these mechanisms produce the causal powers of market systems, and how these powers 
interact with others to produce socio-economic events. For example, each of the buyer 
strategies listed here opens up the possibility of matching strategies employed by sellers 
seeking to secure preferential attachment by appealing to the corresponding motivations, and 
thus the possibility of structural market mechanisms that are driven by the relevant 
combinations of buyer/seller side strategies.  
The need to allow for factors other than the price mechanism is demonstrated, for example, by 
the evidence that, despite the claims of neoclassical economics, most market systems do not 
produce price homogeneity, let alone equilibrium. If we evaluate actual market systems 
against the neoclassical model we find that they often establish a pattern that is more or less 
the opposite of that predicted by the model: instead of homogeneous prices across a ‘market’, 
which move dynamically in response to variations in demand and supply, we often find that 
market systems lead to a diverse set of prices for the same commodity, that is relatively stable 
over the short term. It seems likely that these stable price differentials can be explained in 
part by the mechanism of preferential attachment. There is, again, a clear connection here to 
Chamberlin’s argument: the strategy of pursuing preferential attachment may lead to 
deliberate product differentiation by sellers, thus producing the very de-homogenisation of 
commodities that undermines the empirical viability of the neoclassical model of competitive 
homogeneous markets. 
This is not to deny that there is a price mechanism, which in some circumstances tends to 
produce an equalisation of prices for equivalent products, offers incentives to both buyers and 
sellers, and sometimes produces a tendency towards the mutual adjustment of demand and 
supply. There is widespread evidence of such effects: prices of primary agricultural 
commodities go up and down in response to variations in demand and may lead producers to 
alter the crops they grow; manufacturers producing similar products feel obliged to drop prices 
                                           
11 There is a clear connection here to Bourdieu’s argument concerning the efficiency of the habitus, cited above. 
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when their competitors do and know that if they do not they will lose business; people will 
compare prices for significant purchases and sometimes buy what for them are equivalent 
goods from cheaper sources. 
Nevertheless, non-price mechanisms affecting systemic market outcomes should not be seen 
as market imperfections to be removed by policy, or abstracted from in theorising the working 
of markets, or treated as an exceptional condition. Rather, they are normal features of 
economic behaviour that may play as important a role as price equilibration in determining the 
spread of actual prices, the distribution of transactions, the process of change in economic 
systems, and the benefits obtained from market transactions. If this is so, they should play as 
important a role as price equilibration in the ways in which we theorise the behaviour of 
markets. 
7 SIGNIFICANCE 
The market has always been of central importance to the political project of European union. 
The European project is premised upon the belief that market systems can have beneficial 
effects both at the economic level, in terms of delivering prosperity to a united Europe, and at 
the social level, in terms of producing new levels of integration between formerly divided 
communities. Yet the European project has always recognised the need to regulate markets, to 
manage their sometimes adverse effects on, for example, the environment, public health, 
regional poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Europe, it seems, is founded on an 
ambivalence towards the market.  
That ambivalence, I suggest, is also reflected in academic understandings of the market. The 
potential systemic benefits of market systems are stressed by the neoclassical tradition that 
dominates economics. This tradition tends to see their adverse consequences as resulting from 
imperfections in the market system, to be managed by minimalist interventions designed to 
restore the smooth functioning of the market. On the other hand, it has become commonplace 
for economic sociologists to advance variants of Polanyi’s critique against neoclassical 
economics: that it neglects the essential dependence of market systems on a set of non-
market institutions including the state, law, property, money, and normativity. Such 
dependencies are not merely imperfections but fundamental to the operation of market 
systems, and hence it seems that we should not allow policy towards the market to be 
determined by the neoclassical model. 
At a time when the world is suffering from market-led economic crisis, the neoclassical model 
is surely questionable as a guide to policy. Yet it retains a degree of credibility since its 
competitors are largely unable to theorise the systemic effects of markets, and in particular 
the market-led growth that has been pivotal to the success of the European project. 
This project offers the prospect of new ways of thinking about market systems that 
accommodates some of the most powerful arguments from both traditions in a unified 
framework. It has the potential to show how a variety of different market mechanisms are 
produced, with different kinds of structural effects that interact to produce some of the 
complex phenomena of contemporary economies, and to show how these depend on the kinds 
of social relations that are conventionally theorised by sociologists. Although this is not a 
project with short-term policy-related deliverables, it is my hope that such a framework could 
support the development of a more balanced and productive politics of the market. 
By developing an account of market systems that shows how their systematic economic effects 
are produced by essentially sociological mechanisms the project holds out the promise of a 
new theoretical synthesis for economic sociology, responding to a need that has already been 
identified by leading figures in the discipline (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005: 20). While it is 
perhaps too much to hope that mainstream economists could be persuaded of the value of 
such an approach, it is possible that such a synthesis might provide ways for economic 
sociologists and some traditions in heterodox economics to work together.  
Although this is therefore an ambitious project, it is a logical development of, and built on, my 
previous work. It will adopt a philosophical ontology and a methodology which have already 
been used productively in that work, which has delivered coherent accounts of the ontology of 
structure and agency, discourse, culture, and knowledge. It will also build on the substantive 
content of that work, in particular its ontological accounts of individual human agents, 
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normative institutions, and their relation to organisations, in its construction of an ontology of 
market systems. It therefore holds out the prospect of an economic sociology that is not only 
coherent internally but also consistent with a wider ontology of the social world. 
Such an ontology may also point us towards a more nuanced and constructive critique of 
market systems than is possible from traditions that rest on hostility to markets, such as some 
streams of Marxism, or that accept them uncritically, such as (post) actor-network theory. It is 
therefore compatible with contemporary critical stances that see markets as necessary but not 
necessarily universal, and as requiring regulation that seeks to influence their systemic effects 
rather than taking them to be naturally beneficial (e.g. Nelson, 2002; Wade, 1990). It may 
therefore help to equip us with ways to answer one of the most vital political questions of our 
age: how can market systems be governed in ways that allow us to realise the benefits they 
can offer while minimising their potentially harmful consequences? 
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